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The purpose of this article is an objective 
analysis of the current world nuclear reality 
after the apparent end of the diminished prob­
ability of the global nuclear strategic confron­
tation. Several important aspects of the nucle­
ar legacy at the end of the first century of 
the discovery of radioactivity are brought up 
in the context of the current nuclear arsenal, 
military strategies and civil defense policies 
of current postcold war era. Physical and 
medical consequences of the military and in­
dustrial impact on the biosphere are discussed 
from the viewpoint of the concerns of the 
viability of the tactical nuclear war and nu­
clear industry accidents. A particular empha­
sis focused on the social, economic and psy­
chological consequences of a major accident 
with a brief overview of Chernobyl update 
The prospect of a nuclear nonconfrontation 
and development of the more safe nuclear 
power plants does not diminish global current 
concerns of the legacy of radioactive waste. 
The disposal of the high level, transuranic
and low level nuclear waste presents a major 
ecological concern with no foreseeable resolu­
tion in the near future. It has been discussed 
in detail in order to emphasize a nuclear 
legacy facing the world at the end of this 
century.
The ultimate concern of the misuse of the 
weapon ready nuclear fuel and small yield 
nuclear weapons for the purpose of the nucle­
ar terrorism is addressed by the objective 
analysis of the current post cold war shifts of 
the nuclear fuel and the state sponsored nu­
clear terrorism. This necessitates a uniform 
multinational global cooperation to counter­
act the possibility of the environmental catas­
trophes that might be a consequence of a 
global nuclear terrorist threat. The ultimate 
goal of the community of the nations of utiliz­
ing nuclear energy for the improvement of all 
aspects of life compatible with the ecosystems 
will necessitate multinational collaboration on 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the 
industry, science and medicine.
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The strategic nuclear battlefield is a concept 
related to the war scenario from far behind the 
conventional confrontational lines of battle by the 
use of long range delivery systems of nuclear 
weapons to attack deep into enemy territory. It is 
distinctly different from tactical nuclear warfare,  
wherein short range delivery systems may be used 
to deploy the nuclear weapons with the situations 
of a more conventional battlefield.
This paper addresses several key questions regard­
ing current nuclear reality, where many uncer­
tainties prevail after an apparent end of the Cold 
War. An essential question is the future of the 
process of democratic changes in the former Sovi­
et Union and the future development of dealing 
with the nuclear arsenal in the Russian Republic 
and the independent countries that have seceded
from the Soviet Union, still containing a consid­
erable number of nuclear weapons and weapon 
grade materials, such as Belarus, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. The smuggling activities of Uranium 
and Plutonium nuclear fuel into the countries 
with potential regional conflicts and still unre­
solved issues of the political future of the previous 
Soviet Bloc necessitates a concern of a question of 
what kind of nuclear weapons will be involved, 
what the military strategies are, whether the civil 
defense is possible, what the consequences of a 
nuclear confrontation on tactical or less likely 
strategic scale would be and ultimately, what its 
ecological, social, economic, psychological and medical 
consequences would be.
An important aspect of this paper also deals 
with the issue of the emergency preparedness in
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the event of the major accidents involving nuclear 
industry, transportation of nuclear materials, dis­
posal of high-level radioactive waste and nuclear 
terrorism.
CURRENT GLOBAL NUCLEAR STRA­
T E G Y
Nuclear weapons have evolved from the proto­
type fission bombs deployed in Japan at the 
conclusion of the World War II to the awesome 
arsenal of thermonuclear warheads with constant­
ly updated and increasingly sophisticated delivery 
systems.
The combined arsenal of the United States and 
previous Soviet Union include more than 50,000 
nuclear warheads with a total combined yield of 
approximately 15,000 megatons (explosive power 
of one million tons of TNT) or the equivalent of 
one million Hiroshima bombs (2).
The majority of strategic nuclear weapons are 
deployed by the use of ballistic missiles which are 
launched into space and can orbit intercontinen­
tal distances within the time of minutes. Land 
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 
are deployed in underground silos encased in var­
ious types of reinforced concrete.
The land-based intercontinental missiles are 
often fitted with multiple warheads, targetable 
independently on sites that are hundreds of miles 
apart. They comprise the group of multiple inde­
pendently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The 
largest part of the nuclear arsenal is deployed in 
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The 
Trident submarines carry 24 SLBM with a max- 
imun range of close to 5,000 miles when equipped 
with eight 100 kiloton MIRV warheads (34). The 
advantage of the ICBM systems is mainly con­
tained in their capacity of being highly mobile 
and non-targetable. The disadvantage of ICBM 
systems is that they are targetable and as the 
accuracy of delivery systems improves, the con­
tainment silos become more vulnerable to di- 
recthits by the enemy warheads (2).
Strategic war can also be waged by aircraft. 
Bombers are frequently equipped with short range 
attack missile systems (SRAM) with a range of 
hundreds of miles or long range cruise missiles 
hwich can be navigated thousands of miles into 
the enemy terrytory. Cruise missiles can also be 
launched from submarines and battleships (34).
The most recent advent of the nuclear military 
concerns includes highly sophisticated bombers 
designed to evade radar detection (e.g. Stealth) 
and still experimental use of the laser equipped 
satellites in outer space designed to target and
destroy missiles in flight (Strategic Defense Initia­
tive) (35).
Mutually assured destruction (MAD) has evolved 
as a declared United States policy, being a focal 
point of the strategic relationship between super­
powers during the cold war era (25). Military 
strategists, on the other hand, have developed the 
concept of Nuclear Utilization Target Selection 
(NUTS), which includes plans for using nuclear 
weapons against specific selected targets. Current 
United States and Russian target selection, al­
though recently modified by non-targeting each 
other, has been derived from a countervalue pol­
icy that identifies objects of a national value such 
as military installations, industrial areas and pop­
ulation centers. The premise for this policy is 
that a military destruction of the enemy's com­
mand and control facilities limits the capability 
for a retaliatory strike (38). The concept of mutu­
ally assured destruction has acted as a powerful 
deterrent to the armed conflict among the super­
powers. Although strategists assume that nuclear 
war can be waged on a limited scale, there is a 
high risk of rapid escalation with both sides fear­
ing the other will be first to deliver a cripplig 
preemptive strike. Unfortunately, however, given 
the diversity, decentralization and mobility of nuclear 
arsenals, an attack of this nature will almost 
cerrtainly lead to a massive retaliation with dev­
astating consequences (34).
CIVIL DEFENSE POLICIES
The civil defense policies propagated in the 
United States during the 1950's and the 1960 s 
have gone into a deep decline. This is largely due 
to the greater technical sophistication, reach and 
magnitude of the current nuclear arsenal, in­
creased awareness of the limited liability of pro­
tective measures and a sense of resignation in 
face of a total destruction likely to be wrought by 
a nuclear war (20). Although the Federal Emer­
gency Management Agency (FEMA) has been ad­
vocating increased spending for civil defense, plan­
ning for protective measures in case of nuclear 
war has received rather little support. This is 
likely due to an overwhelming feeling among the 
officials that no meaningful social survival will be 
possible after a nuclear attack. Some have argued 
that a strong civil defense preparedness policy 
would invite a nuclear attack because the enemy 
may assume that the other side is preparing for 
an offensive and would therefore be more likely 
to launch a pre-emptive strike. Others contend 
that sturdy civil defense would only serve as a 
future de-terrent (20).
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Many analysts have concluded that the evacu­
ation planning is unrealistic giving the massive 
traffic congestion which would be an inevitable 
result. FEMA considers that three days would be 
the minimum time required for evacuation of 
Boston and Philadelphia and four days for New 
York City.
However, given that in the event of nuclear 
war there is no safe place for this population to 
go, the level of cooperation with such plans is 
likely to be minimal. Furthermore, mass evacua­
tion would be immediately apparent to the enemy 
through the satellite surveillance and intelligence 
network and would only serve to escalate tensions 
which might in turn increase the risk of the 
attack (20).
MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NU­
CLEAR REALITY
An explosion of a one megaton nuclear weapon 
releases energy equal to one million tons of TNT. 
The first use of the atomic bomb was justified as 
a "terror weapon of the last resort" and sought to 
Pi ace the use of this new military technology 
under international control (41). This energy re­
lease creates the blast, thermal radiation, ionizing 
radiation and radioactive fallout. When a one 
megaton weapon is detonated within 1.000 meters 
above the surface of the earth, photons are emit­
ted within the time of one millionth of a second. 
Most of these X-rays are absorbed into the air 
around them producing an incandescent fireball. 
The fireball reaches the temperature of 100 mil­
lion degrees centigrade, five times higher than 
that of the center of the sun (45).
Approximately three percent of the energy is 
released as a prompt nuclear radiation, consisting 
of X-rays, gamma rays, and neutrons which are 
lathal to approximately 1.7 miles of ground zero 
(20). Forty to fifty percent of the energy released 
by a one megaton bomb is in the form of light 
and heat. This thermal pulse travels at the speed 
of light and ignites fires as far as ten miles away 
Buildings, people, plants and animals will absorb 
most of the heat within a second of detonation 
(45).
The radioactive material carried into the atmo­
sphere by the dirt debris taken up by the nega­
tive pressure in the fireball is heavier than the 
fission materials of the bomb and begins falling 
back to the earth as black rain. The lighter 
materials are carried higher into the atmosphere 
and fall down farther downwind of the explosion. 
Radioactive fallout containing several hundreds of 
different fission products may integrate into the
biosphere causing delayed degenerative, genetic 
and neoplastic disease long after detonation of the 
nuclear weapon (45).
Primary blast effects include injury and death 
from traumatic events as structures collapse caus­
ing internal and external traumatic alterations as 
a consequence of the sudden pressure changes 
producing a pressure of millions of pounds per 
square inch. Some authors suggest that such ob­
jects may have an impact velocity at a range of 
almost fifteen miles, sufficient to have a 50 per­
cent probabilitiy of causing a fracture to the 
human skull (21).
Thermal effects include flash and flame burns. 
As the probability of massive fires is great, such 
effects may lead to the various injuries including 
asphyxia and lung damage from carbon dioxide 
and toxic fumes, as chemicals, fuels and contents 
of the buildings continue to burn. Looking at the 
fireball would produce blindness in some cases 
and mass casualties of heat exhaustion.
Radiation injuries would vary accoriding to the 
size of the bomb and the victim's proximity. Es­
timates are difficult because of the differences 
between the ground and surface bursts, the vari­
ation in wind patterns, type of radiation received 
and the age and general health af victims. How­
ever, it is probable that at least 30 percent of the 
population of the northern hemisphere would re­
ceive doses of at least 2,5 Gy with the entire 
population being exposed to 1 Gy.
Whether the source is the initial burst, fallout 
exposure or the effects of the low level radiation 
during the post attack period, the degree of ill­
ness depends on whether the exposure is local or 
a total-body, as well as whether radiation deposit­
ed is from external penetrating radiation or inter­
nal contamination. The letter is determined by 
the pathways of entry into the internal environ­
ment of the organism, by inhalation, ingestion or 
traumatic lesions (13)
Lethal doses are considered to be in the 4-4.5 
Gy ranges. Such patients die within the weeks 
from one of the radiation induced syndromes. 
Bone marrow (haematopoietic) syndrome (2-10 Gy) 
produces loss of coagulation factors leading to 
various forms of the manifestation of haemor- 
rhagic diathesis whit an impairment and loss of 
specific and non-specific immunological mechanisms 
due to depletion of the lymphocytes and polymor­
phonuclear leukocytes.
Gastrointestinal syndrome (800-3,000 cGy) in­
volves a damage to the intestinal mucosa causing 
severe fluid and ion loss as well as septicemia by 
the entry of the intestinal microflora into the 
intravascular compartment, leading to lethal out­
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come within days to weeks. Neurovascular syn­
drome (over 5,000 cGy) leads to death within 
hours, diminated by the clinical picture of hy­
potension, hyperthemia, projectile emesis, severe 
diarrhea, ataxia, disorientation, circulatory prob­
lems, edema, elevated intracranial pressure, cere­
bral anoxia, oliguria and coma.
Additional effects of ionizing radiation include 
damage to the skin, lungs, gonads and eyes. In 
the general scenario of mass exposures to at least 
100 cGy there are also delayed effects such as 
cataracts, vascular damage, genetic changes, and 
most inportantly malignant alterations. One out 
of 80 persons would likely develop fatal cancer, 
whereas two in 80 persons would develop non 
fatal previously described consequences of ionizing 
radiation (10).
Considering various injuries as independent 
entities may be misleading besause of the syn­
chrony of the moneostatic mechanisms and the 
effests of the combined injuries. Synergistic effests 
of the injureis that would lead to the fatal out­
come in the case that would not be fatal by the 
radiation alone, reduce LD/50 to the lower values 
then 300-450 cGy (28).
In the event of a nuclear war, madical services 
would suffer almost total paralysis. The vast ma­
jority of the hospitals and physicians tend to be 
concentrated in large urban centers, which would 
constitute target areas where destruction and fa­
talities would be highest. Even in the least ad­
verse conditions where only a single major city 
had been bombed, there would not be enough 
medical resources in the United States to provide 
the adequate care for survivors (47). It must also 
be noted that even in the improbable event that 
medical services remained intact, professionals would 
be severely hampered by their total inexperience 
in handling radiation casualties.
ENVIRONMENTAL REALITY
Regardless of scenario and inherent uncetain- 
ties of predictions, there is a concensus within the 
international scientific community that even a 
relatively small scale nuclear war would lead to 
global climatic and environmental consequences of 
catastrophic proportions (40,48)
Multiple nuclear explosions would result in 
millions of tons of fine (a megaton blast carries 
approximately 200,000 tons of dust) being injected 
into the upper atmosphere. In addition an esti­
mated 50 to 150 million tons of smoke would be 
generated from the fires caused by the explosion 
(15), If these particles were spread over half of 
the northern hemisphere, only 50 percent or the
solar energy and light would pass through to the 
earth's surface for a period of weeks (24).
This phenomenology has been extensively stud­
ied as a scenario that might lead to nuclear 
winter, which would cause the temperatures in 
the northern hemisphere to drop between 5 and 
22 degrees centigrade within a few days, causing 
freezing conditions even in summer, with a pro­
jected decrease of precipitation by as much as 80 
percent (24).
Long term effects include an average annual 
temperature decrease of a few degrees and the 
reduction of light by 5 to 20 percent (46). Nitric 
oxide is generated by the nuclear fireball (a mega­
ton explosion generates 5,000 tons of nitric oxide) 
which combines with the very heated smoke re­
sides in the stratosphere. It would reduce the 
ozone layer by 50 percent causing ultraviolet 
radiation (UV) to be increased by 40 to 100 
percent for serveral years (46). The rising smoke 
could also displace the ozone layer toward the 
southern hemisphere, The nitrogen oxides com­
bined with the sulphur oxides from the fires 
would greatly increase the acidity of rains. The 
release of large amounts of taxic chemicals and 
gases during the blasts and fires would cause 
serious local pollution of water, air and soil.
Ecological effects arising out of environmental 
changes induced by nuclear war cannot be fully 
determined because synergistic effects are greater 
than any of the subcomponents of a nuclear 
weapon deployment. Global mass starvation of 
human population would occur due to disturbanc­
es of ecosystems together with agricultural pro­
duction and distribution. The availability of the 
fresh water supplies would be restricted amont 
other factors due to freezing. Contamination by 
the radionuclide products of nuclear fission of the 
fresh water and oceanic supplies and the intro­
duction of the fission products into the food chain 
would lead to further death and diseases as a 
consequence of altered immune system in humans 
and animals (50).
Whether concidering effects on ecosystems such 
as fresh water, oceanic or terrestrial, it is of 
primary importance to recognize that disruption 
of sunlight affects photosynthesis, the transfer 
mechanism through which all life forms derive 
their energy. Thus, any assault on an ecosystem, 
as a whole or in part, would compromise its 
existence or its ability to function. This could 
further lead to increased incidents of mutations, 
pandemias and death (8,17,43,44,51,)
In addition to the diminished light, all surviv­
ing forms of life after a nuclear attack would be 
exposed to other physical stressors such as ultra­
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violet light, ionizing radiation, radionuclide con­
tamination, cold, varied precipitation, acid rain, 
fires and pollutants. The extent to which these 
stressors would diminish and qualitatively reduce 
the life forms would depend to a large extent 
upon the combination, duration, timing and length 
of exposure. Different studies of all of the weather 
and climate modelling, although containing some 
uncertainties, agree in general on the overall 
effects of the consequences of a nuclear weapon 
deployment, including generation of nitrogen ox­
ides, reduction of the ozone layer, increase of 
ultraviolet solar radiation, for several years with 
a long time impairment of the planet's ecological 
systems, including the marine plankton and the 
food supplies from the oceans. However, different 
models including TTAPS, NCAR and Russian the­
ories contain certain defferences, with a Russian 
view that after initial cooling the temperatures 
may rise above normal. Various models are being 
integrated in the international committees such as 
SCOPE (Scientific Committee on Problems of the 
Environment) for the ongoing continuous studies 
(18)
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Without the ability to relocate people from the 
high-risk areas, it has been estimated that less 
than one half of the population of the United 
States would survive the Russian first strike (39). 
Since the social systems with which we are famil­
iar would suffer an instant collapse, the survivors 
would depend on each other and follow the lead­
ership of those demonstrating the most knowledge 
about survival, as it was the case in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki.
Reconstruction of the society is largely depen­
dent upon resources outside the areas of impact. 
The magnitude of destruction likely to result from 
the strategic nuclear conformation would make an 
outside assistance improbable. Medical assistance 
to the victims of the combined injuries would be 
limited because of disintegration of the communi­
ty and the post-disaster recovery would be tied 
with close kin relationships (39) Relocation would 
depend on the areas remaining intact for place­
ment of evacuees, transportation systems and food 
supplies. The family unit will be the most likely 
componant of the foundation of rebuilding of the 
societal structure and function. Communication 
between government and citizens would be com­
promised due to the missing chain of command 
and inoperable equipment. Transportation hin­
drance on a large scale is anticipated because of 
the non-availability of vehicles, rapair parts and
fuel. This would be an additional impediment of 
distibution of basic commodities such as food, 
water and medical supplies.
Strategic war's obliteration of the economic 
infrastructure in an industrial society would be 
immediate, complete and indiscriminate (27). Or­
ganized econimic operations would be annihilated 
due to the focus of impact on urban areas and 
strategic centers. Industrial production would cease, 
since there would be no replacement for essential 
machinery that performs basic functions relative 
to economic viability of the society. Transporta­
tion from storage facilities (primarily located in 
remote areas) would be unavailable for the distri­
bution of basic commodities, contrary to the in­
formation provided in the report of the Civil  
Preparedness Agency of the United States (6). 
The temperature decrease and radioactive fallout 
would eliminate economic potential in agriculture.
Society after a strategic nuclear war would 
undergo extreme fundamental changes with the 
availability of goods and services reduced to the 
bare minimum and total disappearance of the 
activities that are taken for granted in a normally 
functioning society (6). The government and polit­
ical structures would be dramatically impaired 
due to the authorities inability to respond to an 
emergency. Compatition for leadership at the local 
level could impede relief efforts. The strain of 
large scale damage and physical deprivation would 
lead to greater disaffection and hostility toward 
government and its representatives (24).
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCERNS
Current research attempts to address the com­
plexity of psychological impact by drawing histo­
rical analogies from man-made and natural disas­
ters.
Several common behavioral changes apparent 
in survivors of catastrophes are that survivors 
suffer from a loss of meaning, loss of will to live, 
profound apathy and general depressed motivation 
state (5, 16, 19, 30). At the family level, a small 
and very independent unit, a varying combination 
of post disaster stressors (i.e. degree of destruc­
tion, disorganization and casualties) introduce 
multidimensional consequences. Research investi­
gating the effects of war upon children since 
World War II suggests that children model paren­
tal response to trauma (10, 33). Post-traumatic 
symptoms include psychosomatic complaints, in­
somnia, nightmares, chronic fatigue, fear of recur­
rence, fear of people and regressive and overt 
aggressive tendencies (10, 33, 42).
It is generally acknowledged in the literature
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that psychological disturbances following a nucle­
ar disasters will be associated with the state of a 
marked anxiety, characterized by apprehension, 
fear, confusion and irritability (12). Survivors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were observed to display 
characteristics of physical numbness, survivor's 
guilt, mental decompensation, various psychoneuro­
logical disorders, permanent fear and uncertainty, 
a lifelong identification with the dead and fear of 
radiation and contamination of future generations
(5). It is clear psychological reactions of survivors 
may continue for months or years following a 
nuclear exchanges (5). Long term effects could 
include demoralization and severe disruption of 
the social structure.
Finally, the issue of assistance available to 
survivors of a nuclear attack needs to be ad­
dressed. Several researchers outline the following 
factors that have to be considered: the number of 
victims with mental and behavioral disturbances, 
the number of mental health professionals avail­
able to provide treatment following a nuclear 
confrontation, the amount of time required for 
treatment, the availability of treatment facilities 
and availability of the pharmaceutical supplies 
needed for treatment (12). It seems apparent that 
no adequate treatment would be available for the 
vast number of psychological casualties.
THE CONCERNS OF THE VIABILITY OF  
NUCLEAR WAR
Thermonuclear weapons have radically changed 
the nature of the strategic battlefield. With the 
development of highly accurate delivery systems, 
multiple warhead missiles and huge arsenal of 
weapons, the opposing sides in any nuclear con­
flict face the real prospect that their countries 
could be subjected to attack and unprecedente 
destruction.
Continued theorising in defense establishments 
about strategies for fighting and winning a nucle­
ar war seems to be contradicted by the inescap­
able realities of the nuclear battlefield for some of 
the following reasons.
1. No effective defense against nuclear weapons 
has been developed and even with the advent 
of Strategic Defense Initiative none is antici­
pated in the foreseeable future. Current Civil 
Defense planning does not offer any reason­
able prospects for protecting civilian popula­
tion in the event of a nuclear exchange.
2. Neither side could avoid substantial retaliation 
in a nuclear war even if it succeeded in 
carrying out a relatively successful first strike. 
Non-targetable, mobile launchers, such as sub­
marines at sea and aircraft in the air, would 
ensure that even the victorious side in such a 
scenario will sustain hundreds, if not thou­
sands of strikes on its cities, industrial facili­
ties and military bases and installations.
3. It is a matter of considerable doubt whether 
any nuclear war, once initiated, could remain 
limited or be readily contained or ended. Once 
either side has sustained, a serious attack, the 
pressure, both political and military, to coun­
terattack would likely be irresistible. More­
over, current counter-command strategies (i. e. 
targeting the other side's leadership for early 
strikes), might well ensure the elimination of 
anyone with a sufficient authority to quickly 
halt an exchange.
4. The consequences of any substantial nuclear 
exchange would be a massive destruction to 
both sides, including:
the obliteration of major urban centers
• hunderds of millions of direct and indirect 
fatalities
• severe injury to surviving population, in­
cluding radiation syndromes, combined inju­
ries and radionuclide contamination
destruction of medical facilities and the 
disruption of health care, resulting in high 
mortality among the injuried and pandemic 
spread of infectious diseases 
the widespread destruction of agricultural 
and industrial production, communication net­
works, transportation systems and economic 
infrastrukture
• mass psychological damage to survivors
5. Extensive scientific research in recent years 
has indicated that even a "modest" nuclear 
exchange is likely to have a severe and lasting 
impact on the biosphere. It now seems clear 
that these effects would be so serious and 
pervasive that even in an unlikely event that 
one side could attack first and completely 
escape retaliation, the "winner" will experience 
disastrous levels of environmental damage and 
millions of fatalities.
As on-going research expands our understand­
ing of the probable inpact of the nuclear war, the 
viability of thermonuclear weapons as "usable" 
instruments of war is increasingly thrown into 
question. In contrast to the myth of the winnable 
nuclear war, the reality of the strategic nuclear 
battlefield remains mutually assured destruction.
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NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACCIDENTS  
AND CHERNOBYL UPDATE
Industrial accidents involving radioactive sources 
include medical institutions, research facilities, 
private industries that employ radioactive isotopes 
and nuclear power plants (1, 7, 22, 23, 31, 49). 
The meticulous reference material on all of the 
types of the industrial accidents is well compiled 
and recorded (54).
By far the most significant current global con­
cern of the possibility of nuclear accidents of 
mass casualties involves the potential disasters at 
the nuclear power plants. Between 1970 and 1981 
fifty US nuclear reactors released into the envi­
ronment over 40 million Curies of radionuclides, 
equivalent to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The 
misleading contention that a Chernobyl type acci­
dent is not possible in the United States is illus­
trated by a probability of an explosion following 
a loss of coolant which may lead to contamina­
tion of fuel with water in a reactor wessel. It was 
testified before the congressional subcommittee in 
1986, that in then existing 100 nuclear reactors 
in the USA a probability of an accident would 
range between 12 and 45 percent. The most 
significant nuclear power plant accidents occurred 
at NRX Reactor in Chalk River, Canada in 1958, 
Windscale, England in 1957, McKeesport, Ohio in 
I960, Idaho Falls in 1961, Detroit Fermi Reactor 
in 1963, Hanford N Reactor in 1970, Calvert 
Cliffs emission in 1975, Browns Ferry, Alabama in
1975, Rancho Seco, California in 1978, Pilgrim 
Reactor, Plymouth, Massachusettes in 1981, Ginna 
Reactor in Rochester N.Y. in 1982 and Shipping 
port Reactor, Pennsylvania in 1971.
The worst accident involving nuclear power 
plants in the United States occurred at the Three 
Mile Island Unit 2 reactor in Pennsylvania, re­
sulting in 40 cGy/hour exposure in the nearby 
town of Goldsboro only two miles from the plant. 
An average estimate of 16 million Curies of radio­
active noble gases and only 14 Curies of iodine- 
131 escaped into the environment. The controver­
sy still exists about the incidence of cancers, 
leukemia, stillbirths, spontaneous abortions, hair- 
loss, thyroid disease and numerous other disease 
entities among the humans and farm animals. 
The clean-up of the plant has been in the multi­
billion dollar range. Over 150 tons of radioactive 
waste has been transported to the Idaho Falls 
awaiting its final repository. Over ten thousand 
temporary workers have been involved in the 
clean up process with an estimated 13,000-46,000 
man/rem doses to be apsorbed with still ongoing 
scientific debate of the probability of genetic defects.
The worst radiation accident in the history of 
nuclear power occurred on April 26, 1986 at 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, when 
due to the human error in a RBMK type nuclear 
reactor the emergency core cooling system was 
shut off in an experiment (7). In several seconds 
reactor power exploded shattering the fuel rods 
and turning water to steam, followed by the 
second explosion probably caused by hydrogen, 
blowing the radioactive material and burning graph­
ite in the biosphere (52). Over 18 tons of radio­
active material escaped into the environment. 30 
kilometers exclusion zone was established around 
the plant, 140,000 people were evacuated within
11 days and approximately 17 million people re­
ceived radioactive contamination including 2.5 
million children under 5 years of age. The ongo­
ing research indicates a significant increase of 
lymphocytic leukemia, multiple myelo and thyroid 
disease. Although it is too early to estimate the 
ultimate outcome, the most recent BEIR V (Bio­
logical Effects of Ionizing Radiation) report point­
ed out that the received radiation doses might be 
higher than initialy considered. The current re­
search provides still ongoing analisys of data op- 
tained on the follow-up of Chernobyl children in 
different centers around the world, one of the 
most prominent being the medical and epidemio­
logical analysis of the evacuated children in Kfar 
Chabad Center in Israel. The total amount of 
radioactive organotropic radionuclides released into 
the environment has not yet been determined 
with certainty. The most recent data indicate that 
Chernobyl accident released total radioactivity of 
1-2 EBq, excluding noble gases as xenon and 
krypton (26). Cesium-137 emitted into the envi­
ronment represents at least 30 percent of the 
total cesium-137 inventory in the core of the 
damaged reactor (3).
LEGACY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Radioactive waste is created in basically two 
diferent ways, one being fragments of nuclear 
fision form eighter nuclear power plants or nucle­
ar weapons. The other major category of nuclear 
waste is spent nuclear fuel. When the fuel rods 
are irradiated in a nuclear reactor and withdrawn 
from use, the remaining fuel is still highly radio­
active, containing over 600,000 Curies per metric 
ton. The current accumulated radioactivity in the 
US in spent fuel alone is over ten billion Curies. 
Radioactive decay from this fuel generates close to 
40 Magawatts of heat (29). By the year 2000 it is 
anticipated that over 73,000 metric tons of spent 
nuclear fuel will be accumulated in the United
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States. The permanent storage sites for the spent 
fuel in the US is still an unresolved isue.
High level radioactive waste remains after ura­
nium and plutonium are extracted from spent 
nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Military pro­
grams utilize reprocessing for recovering plutoni­
um from the production of nuclear weapons and 
as a part of the fuel cycle of naval reactors. The 
current inventory of high level waste is over
300,000 cubic meters at the end of the year 1990. 
In the United States there are four sities of 
storage of high-level waste, including the Hanford 
reservation, Washington State, Savannah River 
Plant, South Carolina, Idaho Fals and West Valley, 
New York State.
Another category is transuranic waste, mainly 
including uranium, plutonium, neptunium and  
americium from nuclear reactors. Most transuran­
ic wastes are being created by the military pro­
grams. In 1980, 24 million cubic ffet of these 
wastes were buried at 8 of the government and 4 
commercial sities in this country alone.
The last categry is low-level waste, including 
radioactive materials got created from reprocess­
ing or tailings and having wery low transuranic 
contents, including medical and research wastes, 
control rods from the reactors, residues from ura­
nium conversion, enrichment and fabrication and 
contaminated items used in handling of radiation. 
In the US there are 6 low-level waste sites oper­
ated by DOE and three commercial sites in oper­
ation, mostly buried in shallow trenches. In 40 
years from now, all of the 111 commercial reac­
tors and 93 military and research reactors will be 
too contaminated to continue operation, not counting 
126 reactor-driven naval vessels that will all be­
come part of the discarded low-level waste.
There are three basic strategies of managing 
radioactive waste. The first category is to retain 
them until decay to the harmless state-mainly 
intended for the short half-life radionuclides. The 
second categry is to dilute and disperse them over 
a wide area. The third category is to concentrate 
them and prevent their migration in the environ­
ment, mainly intended for the waste of long half- 
life radioactive materials. Concentration of radio­
active wastes can be achieved eighter by the 
evaporation of excess liquid, by their precipitation 
as a solid matter from a large volume of material 
or by the process of burning the materials, re­
taining the ashes and filtering the gases.
The radioactive wastes of the United States 
have been studied for disposal by the numerous 
methods. The main approach includes the storage 
in underground tanks. However, it has been found 
prone to early leakage and contamination of the
environment. In addition, they require an elabo­
rate cooling system and constant attendance for 
the integrity of the containment. Aboveground 
storage has also been found impractical for the 
long-lived radioactive waste, although their cool­
ing systems have certain advantages over under­
ground tanks. Burial in the ocean floor, capped 
deep cracks or in the bottom silt was based on 
the dilution and has encountered considerable 
environmental controversies owing to concerns of 
permanent contamination of waters.
Permanent removal of radioactive waste from 
the biosphere by the rocket launching into the 
space, appeared impractical from the viewpoint of 
the cost of over a billion dollars per launch (36) 
and the risks of catastrophic concequences for the 
environment in the event of an explosion of a 
launch vehicle.
Another suggestion of disposal of the radioac­
tive waste in the ice of Antarctica (37) although 
attractive, remains an area of considerable contro­
versy because of disruption of the ecosystems.
Several other methods have been entertained, 
including transmutation of the radioactive waste 
by the neutron bombardment, the creation of the 
zones as national waste monuments, separation of 
the high and low activity waste, deep geologic 
burial six to ten miles below the surface of the 
earth, or 3,000 meters in the hard rocks, horizon­
tal burial in the shafts of the mountains, burial 
on the lonely islands, soldification in the stable 
mineral matrix, the burial in canisters in mines 
and glassification of the radioactive waste, which 
is currently used in France. Grouting has been 
proposed as mixing of radioactive waste with ce­
ment and burial in shallow pits, a process being 
developed in Australia to incorporate waste into a 
mineral matrix of synthetic rock. Calcination is a 
proposed process of atomizing the wastes and 
drying them at high temperatures. The current 
approach in this country is the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Project in Carlsbad, New Mexico, which has 
been challenged by the possibility of leakage. WIPP 
has encountered the resistance from the States of 
Colorado, Idaho and New Mexico. At present, the 
problem of radioactive waste remains unresolved. 
This particuraly refers to not even addressed waste 
amounts of radioactive waste in the former Soviet 
Union including ecological disasters of uncontrolled 
disposal sites in the Ural mountains, Chelyabinsk, 
Kyshtim and numerous undisclosed sites, includ­
ing decommissioned military installations. This 
problem will remain the major global concern for 
the biosphere viability
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NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The risk of weapon-ready nuclear fuel being 
illegally acquired and made into actual nuclear 
weapons is a viable global concern, especially 
after 1980's which was declared a decade of ter­
rorism. In June 1985 a conference was held in 
Washington D.C. under the sponsorship of the 
Nuclear Control Institute and State University of 
New York Institute for Studies of International  
Terrorism that addressed The Nuclear Dimension 
of International Terrorism. The concluding guide­
lines of the conference included organizing an 
International Task Force for the Prevention of 
International Terrorism.
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
smuggling of nuclear fuel activities has been sig­
nificantly enhanced for the reason of lesser con­
trol of the borders and easier availability of the 
purchase of nuclear fuel. The theft of fissionable 
materials or nuclear weapons is routinely report­
ed in the press, with a conclusion that plausibility 
of using nuclear material in terrorist actions in­
creases with the increased accessibility to the 
theft and transportation of fissionable materials. 
The Gallup poll opinious consistently indicate that 
nuclear incidents involving terrorist acts are more 
plausible than even a tactical nuclear confronta­
tion. It appears greatly enhanced by the State 
sponsored terrorism, where the financial resourc­
es, intelligence, transportation and technical ex­
pertise add to the possibility of terrorist go nucle­
ar. Recent, much publicized threats of Serbian 
self-styled government in occupied Bosnia is an 
example of a declared intent to attack a nuclear 
power plant in Slovenia in the event of the 
tactical necessity in their war of aggression. Over 
260 nuclear power plants throughout the world 
are the prime targets of sabotage, including the 
facilities of fuel enrichment reprocessing and fab­
rication plants and transportation routes. In 1978, 
the CIA emphasized the nuclear arsenals in West­
ern Europe as potential target for the terrorist 
attacks, since a theft of a nuclear weapon would 
be an easier task for a terrorist act than the 
process of building the bomb. This report neces­
sitates physical security of the weapon production 
and storage facilities as a primary concern for the 
security of over 50,000 nuclear weapons currently 
present in the world, and all in the possession of 
the superpowers, particularly after the end of the 
Soviet Union. Two major routes of smuggling of 
nuclear fuel have been identified as Asian and 
European, mainly through Kazakhstan and Ger­
many, respectively, including highly enriched ura­
nium (HEU) and separated plutonium. Since both
of these materials are being used in the world of 
commerce as civilian fuels for the research reac­
tors (HEU) and power reactors (Pu-239), it is 
quite conceivable that shipment of nuclear fuel 
may become the target of terrorist hijacking. In 
October 1984 alone, there was the transportation 
of United States originated plutonium from France 
to Japan, enough to produce over 30 nuclear 
weapons. The original shipment plans were so 
poorly planned that the shipment had to be de­
layed for two years until synchronized by the US, 
French and Japanese military kommands at the 
cost of multimillion dollars security improvements. 
Regardless of increased awareness of the risk of 
theft of weapon-grade fissionable material and 
relative ease of producing a nuclear weapon, in 
the year 1981 alone there was an unaccounted 
missing of over 409.9 kg of fissionable material. 
This issue still remains unresolved, while in Rus­
sia and independent republics of the Soviet Union 
there is not even a basic database on the missing 
weapon-grade fuel inventory. Hundreds of smug­
gling activities have been intercepted in the past 
several years, allowing a conclusion of much greater 
number of successful smuggling of the weapon- 
grade material, since it is not difficult to smuggle 
nuclear explosives across international borders. 
The black market value of a kilogram of cocaine 
is approximately the same as a kilogram of ura­
nium. The psychology of treason is not always 
ideologically exemplified, as in the recent cases of 
the US Navy personnel who betrayed the military 
secrets not for ideological reasons, but for finan­
cial gains. Philosophical reasons, such as political 
and religious fundamentalism, may play an equal­
ly important role in nuclear terrorism. In Sep­
tember 1976 it was reported that Yugoslav offi­
cials assisted the international master terrorist 
Carlos escape apprehension with a small nuclear 
bomb, intended for terrorist operations (11). The 
hoaxes of a threat of nuclear terrorism have been 
effectively used as a psychological weapon and 
they have been handled by the US NEST team 
(Nuclear Emergency Search Team), which acts in 
cooperation with other international agencies, as 
exemplified by the NEST-Canadian operation in 
locating and cleaning up debris of a Soviet nucle­
ar satelite in 1978. Since 1978, the US NEST 
team has responded to over 80 nuclear bomb 
threats. The bombing of the World Trade Center 
in 1992 resulted in an awareness of a need of 
better preparedness for detection of nuclear weap­
on-grade materials which are virtually undetect­
able by the means of conventional gamma detec­
tors, being mostly alpha and beta emitters. The 
emerging times appear more serious than the
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decade of terrorism in 1980's, because of an eas­
ier access to fissionable material and higher prob­
ability for state-sponsored terrorism (9).
Nuclear terrorism is not limited to the weap­
ons alone, since it is easier to use radiological 
weapons such as plutonium dust, which even in 
the amount of 84.4 grams could provide a lethal 
effect for a building as World Trade Center if 
evenly dispersed through the air conditioning sys­
tem.
•Release of radioactivity in the bios ph ere by 
targeting nuclear power plants as a form of nu­
clear terrorism has already been mentoined as a 
tactical weapon of renegade terrorist governments, 
as exemplified by the threat of Bosnian Serb 
leadership to the Slovenian nuclear power plant 
in Videm-Krško in 1994.
The International Task Force on Prevention of 
Nuclear Terrorism organized by the Nuclear Con­
trol Institute in Washington D.C. outlines a num­
ber of ways by which terrorists can go nuclear, 
including a theft of nuclear weapons, interception 
of a shipment of fissionable material, acquisition 
of the fissionable material in the reactors or 
waste sites', or using the radiological weapons as 
dispersal devices (4). The Task Force presents a 
view of an increase in likelihood of nuclear ter­
rorism because of growing incidence of conven­
tional forms of terrorism, state support of terror­
ist groups, laxity in the global safeguards at the 
nuclear materials sites, increasing use of civilian 
nuclear programs and an increase in the black 
market availability of fissionable materials. Ac­
cording to the Task Force, there have been at 
least 155 attacks and violent demonstrations at 
the sites of civilian nuclear installations in the 
past 20 years, although none of them caused any 
accident of a significant impact (52).
Antinuclear terrorism preparedness must in­
clude bilateral and multilateral cooperation among 
the nations. The best example of a national pro­
gram to cope with a nuclear catastrophe has been 
established in Switzerland, where the civil defense 
program was formed as a part of national de­
fense. The key elements of nuclear safety include 
both prevention and emergency preparedness, il­
lustrated by the virtual absence of any major 
nuclear accident in China in the past 30 years. 
This has been further accomplished by the imple­
mentation of the nuclear emergency program of 
China (CNNC) after Three Mile Island and Cher­
nobyl accidents (53). Crisis management of nucle­
ar terrorism must include three essential compo­
nents: readiness, response and recovery. Public 
awareness of the nuclear terrorist threat must be 
svnchronized with a realistic and responsible me­
dia coverage with more emphasis on prevention 
than handling an actual crisis (32). The world 
governments have to be prepared to take terrorist 
threats seriously, by identification of the sources, 
analysis of the motives, and a total military style 
of their annihilation (14). At present, it remains a 
source of global nuclear reality in the light of 
well-demonstrated incapability of the community 
of nations to cope even with the state sponsored 
non-nuclear terrorism.
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Sažetak
MEDICINSKI ASPEKTI DANAŠNJE NUKLEARNE STVARNOSTI
Asaf Duraković
Služba za  nuk learnu medic inu ,  Amer ičk i  od je l 
za skrb  o  ve teran ima,  Reg iona ln i  med ic insk i 
centar ,  Wi lmington,  De laware ,  SAD
Ci l j  ovog rada je  ob jek t ivna ana l iza  današn je 
sv je tske nuk learne s tvarnost i  u  sv je t lu  sma­
n jene v je ro ja tnos t i  g loba lnog s t ra teškog nuk lear ­
nog sukoba.  Is taknuto  je  neko l iko  važn ih  aspe- 
kata  nuk learne os tavš t ine  na k ra ju  s to l jeća u 
ko jem je  o tk r ivena rad ioak t ivnost  u  konteks tu 
posto jećeg nuk learnog arsena la  te  vo jn ih  s t ra te­
g i ja  i  koncepc i ja  c iv i lne  zaš t i te  u  današn jem 
post -h ladnora tovskom razdob l ju .  Rasprav l ja  se
0 f i z ika ln im i  med ic insk im pos l jed icama vo jnog
1 indust r i j skog u t jeca ja  na b ios feru  sa  s ta ja l i š ta
i  da l je  pr isu tne moguće opasnost i  od  tak t ičkog 
nuk learnog ra ta  i  nesreća u  nuk learn im indus­
t r i j sk im post ro jen j ima.  Posebno se nag lašava ju 
soc i ja lne ,  ekonomske i  ps iho loške pos l jed ice 
ve l ike  a tomske nesreće,  uz  k ra tk i  p reg led 
na jnov i j ih  podataka o  Černob i lu .
Izg led i  da  do nuk learnog sukoba neće doć i  te 
razvo j  s igurn i j ih  a tomsk ih  cent ra la  ne umanju­
ju  g loba lnu zabr inu tos t  zbog nas l jeđa rad ioak­
t ivnog o tpada.  Od lagan je  t ransuranskog,  v iso­
ko  i  n iskorad ioak t ivnog o tpada predstav l ja 
ogroman eko lošk i  p rob lem,  č i je  se  r ješen je  ne 
naz i re  u  b l i sko j  budućnost i .  O tome se u  radu 
deta l jno  govor i  kako b i  se  nag las i l i  razmjer i 
nuk learne os tavš t ine  s  ko jom je  sv i je t  suočen 
kra jem ovog s to l jeća.  Napokon,  nag lašava se 
prob lem z loupot rebe oruž ja  nami jen jenog 
nuk learnog gor iva  i  nuk learnog oruž ja  male 
snage u  svrhu nuk learnog te ror izma,  uz  o  b jek- 
t i vnu ana l izu  pos t -h ladnora tovsk ih  promjena 
nuk learnog gor iva  i  d ržavnog nuk learnog te r ­
or izma.  Sprečavan je  pr i je tn je  g loba lnog nuk lear ­
nog te ror izma i  n jegov ih  pos l jed ica  u  ob l iku 
eko lošk ih  ka tas t ro fa  zaht i jeva  jed ins tvenu 
mul t inac iona lnu g loba lnu ^suradn ju .  Konačn i  c i l j  
za jedn ice  naroda -  kor iš ten je  a tomske energ i je 
za pobo l jšan je  sv ih  aspekata  ž ivo ta  u  sk ladu s 
ekos is temima -  uv je tovano je  međunarodnom 
suradn jom u mi ro l jub ivo j  upot reb i  a tomske  
energ i je  u  indust r i j i ,  znanost i  i  med ic in i .
K l jučne r i ječ i :  medic ina ,  nuk learna s tvarnost
